San Martin's Last Plan: The Battle Nobody Commanded
In August 1822 San Martin wrote that his last campaign could not fail. In January 1823 that army of veterans was destroyed at Torata and Moquegua in forty-eight hours, and the general who led it later wrote that he had not been at the first battle.
Chapters
- 0:00 Impossible to fail
- 0:24 Who commanded Torata?
- 0:47 The last plan
- 1:23 4,490 men
- 1:55 The battalion that stayed
- 2:20 Fifty-seven days at sea
- 2:40 A weight only he could carry
- 3:04 Three weeks in Arica
- 3:32 The month the Spanish needed
- 4:10 Valdes walks away
- 4:38 Inertness and irresolution
- 4:58 Marching to its destruction
- 5:28 Torata, 4 p.m.
- 5:56 A monument, the same day
- 6:14 Two brothers
- 6:36 Eight rounds per man
- 7:02 Moquegua
- 7:29 What came back
- 7:56 'I was not in it'
- 8:24 Nobody commanded
- 8:52 The plan, buried
- 9:17 Peru calls him back
Transcript
Impossible to fail 0:00
Five months before this battle, San Martin wrote that it was impossible to have a bad outcome. On the nineteenth of January, eighteen twenty-three, at four in the afternoon, his army attacked the hills of Torata. By sunset the infantry had no ammunition left, and was shot in the back as it ran. And the general who led that army later wrote that he was not there.
Who commanded Torata? 0:24
This is the story of a plan that could not fail, and of the army it lost in forty-eight hours. Almost every number in it comes from one book, Bartolome Mitre's history of San Martin. A few come from a British officer who fought in that campaign. And at the end, the question is simple. Who commanded the battle of Torata?
The last plan 0:47
Before he left Peru in September eighteen twenty-two, San Martin drew one last campaign. An army of the south would sail to the small ports below Lima, land, and drive inland like a wedge, toward Arequipa and Cuzco. At the same time, an army of the center under Arenales would march on the Spanish lines in the highlands. Mitre calls it the last flash of his military genius. He also names its capital defect. It was not decisive. Everything depended on two armies moving at the same time.
4,490 men 1:23
The army of the south was the best he had. Mitre counts four thousand four hundred and ninety men, veterans of Chacabuco and Maipu. About nineteen hundred Argentines, twelve hundred Chileans, the rest Peruvians, and ten mountain guns. Five hundred and thirty-six of them were left on shore, sick, before it sailed. San Martin's own letter had said four thousand three hundred. The two counts do not agree, and the episode keeps both.
The battalion that stayed 1:55
There was also a Colombian division in Lima, sent by Bolivar. Before sailing, the general of the south asked its commander for just one battalion, so that four flags would march together. The answer was that he was not authorized. Bolivar's orders were plain. The division was not to be risked without the most absolute probability of success.
Fifty-seven days at sea 2:20
The convoy left Callao in the first half of October. Then the wind died. Calms, and trouble with the transports, held it at sea. It took fifty-seven days to sight the ports it was sailing for. The plan needed speed. It had already lost two months.
A weight only he could carry 2:40
The man in command was Rudecindo Alvarado, an Argentine from Salta. On the seventeenth of December, he wrote to San Martin. General San Martin, he said, loaded on my shoulders a weight that only he could carry. The enterprise seems too hard to me. Still, my spirit does not fail, and I have a hope of triumph.
Three weeks in Arica 3:04
Then he waited in Arica for three weeks. Later he explained why. Of the seven hundred horses shipped from Chile, only four hundred arrived, late and in bad shape. But a local correspondent wrote to San Martin on the twenty-second of December. As soon as the ships appeared, he said, mules and horses began to come in. Between nine hundred and a thousand mules, brought by owners who had kept them hidden.
The month the Spanish needed 3:32
Mitre's verdict on those three weeks is short. What was missing was not horses. It was a head, and a firm will. San Martin himself, he reminds the reader, had landed at Huacho and taken the line of Huaura with twenty-five horses. On the other side, the Spanish divisions were spread over more than two thousand kilometers of mountains. They needed about a month to gather. The slow voyage and the wait in Arica gave them that month. When the first sails appeared off the coast, General Valdes was already on the heights of Moquegua.
Valdes walks away 4:10
On the first of January, Valdes tried to surprise the patriot vanguard at Tacna, with eight hundred men. His guides lost him in the desert at night. By midday he had more than two thousand men in front of him. He thought himself lost, as he admitted later. So he made a show of wanting to fight. The patriot general did not attack. At sunset, Valdes simply marched away.
Inertness and irresolution 4:38
A British officer, William Miller, was in that campaign. His memoirs say that only one thing saved Valdes, and Colonel Ameller, the two best officers the royalists had. The inertness and irresolution of Martinez and Alvarado. Martinez was the second in command.
Marching to its destruction 4:58
On the thirteenth of January, Alvarado finally moved, into the valley of Locumba, to march on Moquegua. Mitre says it was exactly what Valdes wanted. The road was one he had already studied, and Canterac's army was coming down behind him. Two days before the battle, Valdes wrote to Canterac. So far everything has gone as I wished. The enemy, without noticing it, marches to its total destruction.
Torata, 4 p.m. 5:28
On the nineteenth, at four in the afternoon, the two armies stood face to face at Torata. The patriots attacked up the slope. A Spanish battalion spread out across the center, shouting, here is Gerona. Then part of Canterac's reinforcement appeared on the crest above, shouting, long live the king. The patriot infantry ran out of ammunition, turned, and was shot in the back.
A monument, the same day 5:56
The sun was going down. And Mitre adds one sentence that is hard to read twice. On the same day, in the same hours as that defeat, the Congress of Peru decreed a monument at Arica. It was to honor the liberating army of the south.
Two brothers 6:14
The Peruvian Legion, in its first battle, held its ground when the rest gave way. Miller's memoirs add a footnote. Ensign Rivero, of the Legion, was among the dead at Torata. His body was found on the field by his brother. The brother was a lieutenant colonel, and he commanded a royalist battalion.
Eight rounds per man 6:36
That night Alvarado fell back to Moquegua. When the cartridge boxes were counted, there were eight rounds per man. A council of war met. Some wanted to retreat by land, some to embark at the port of Ilo. Alvarado said that if he had only fifty soldiers, he would fight the Spaniards with them. They stayed. Mitre calls it a resolution born of spite.
Moquegua 7:02
At dawn on the twenty-first, the royal army came into view of Moquegua. The patriot line was strong, but a high ridge on its right had been left unguarded. Valdes took it, and attacked from there while Canterac struck the front. Lavalle's mounted grenadiers charged twice to cover the retreat, and were broken in their turn. The Spanish count was seven hundred dead and wounded, and a thousand prisoners.
What came back 7:29
What was left embarked at Ilo. Of the four thousand men of the expedition, Mitre writes, little more than one thousand came back to Lima. Miller says Alvarado could persuade only about three hundred of them to sail south with him, to Iquique. There, in February, he sent a small party ashore. The Spanish general Olaneta was hidden in the village, and killed or took all of them.
'I was not in it' 7:56
Now the question from the beginning. Alvarado signed the official report of the battle, printed in the Lima gazette on the fifth of February. Later, he wrote a memoir. And there, in his own words, he says something else. I have said nothing, on purpose, of the fight at Torata, forty-eight hours before Moquegua. Because I was not in it, and because my judgment would not be thought impartial.
Nobody commanded 8:24
Mitre quotes that sentence in a footnote, and draws the conclusion himself. If it is true, he writes, then nobody commanded the battle of Torata. The second in command, Martinez, describes only the orders he gave for the retreat. Which suggests, Mitre says, that he arrived just at that moment. An army of veterans fought its decisive battle, and neither of its generals claims to have led it.
The plan, buried 8:52
So was the plan wrong, or the men who carried it out? Mitre does not choose. The posthumous plan, he writes, was abandoned and discredited. Either by the faults of those who carried it out, or because perhaps it was not the road to final victory. San Martin wrote that a bad outcome was impossible. By then he had already left Peru.
Peru calls him back 9:17
After Torata and Moquegua, Mitre writes, all eyes in Peru turned back to him. Letters reached him from Lima, and from the government of Chile, asking him to return. One of them came from the man who now ruled Peru. Next episode: Peru calls San Martin back, and the answer he sent from Mendoza to its president.
Description and sources
This episode follows San Martin's posthumous plan through the pages of Bartolome Mitre's Historia de San Martin (vol. IV, 1890, ch. XLVIII, pp. 7-24 and 40-41) and the Memoirs of General Miller (vol. II, London, 1829, pp. 19-21).
The plan (Mitre, pp. 7-9): an army of the south to land at the 'intermediate ports' and drive inland toward Arequipa and Cuzco, while Arenales marched on Jauja; its success depended on both moving at once, and Mitre names its capital defect: it was not decisive. San Martin had written to O'Higgins on 25 August 1822 that the army was '4,300 picked men' and that 'it is impossible to have a bad outcome' (vol. III, p. 661, note 25). Mitre's own count is 4,490 (p. 10), with 536 left ashore sick (note 12).
The delays: the convoy left Callao between 1 and 15 October and took fifty-seven days to sight the ports (p. 11). Alvarado wrote to San Martin on 17 December that he had been given 'a weight that only he could carry' (p. 13), then stayed three weeks in Arica. His excuse was horses -- 400 of 700 arrived (p. 14) -- but a correspondent wrote that 900 to 1,000 mules were brought in by their owners (note 20). Mitre recalls that San Martin had taken the line of Huaura with 25 horses (p. 15).
The battles: at Calana, on 1 January, Valdes with 800 men was allowed to walk away from more than 2,000 (pp. 16-18); Miller's memoirs blame 'the inertness and irresolution of Martinez and Alvarado' (vol. II, p. 19). At Torata, on 19 January at 4 p.m., the patriot infantry ran out of ammunition and was shot in the back; on the same day Peru's Congress decreed a monument at Arica to the liberating army of the south (pp. 21-22). Back at Moquegua there were eight rounds per man; on the 21st the army was broken -- 700 dead and wounded and 1,000 prisoners by the Spanish count (pp. 22-23). Of four thousand men, little more than one thousand came back to Lima (p. 24).
The footnote: Alvarado signed the official report (Gaceta del Gobierno, 5 February 1823), but in his memoir he says he 'was not in' the fight at Torata. Mitre concludes that, if so, nobody commanded the battle (p. 21, note 25).
Losses are given as each side reported them: over 500 patriot dead and wounded at Torata against a Spanish admission of 250 (Mitre, p. 22); Miller cites the royalist reports of 150 killed and 250 wounded in both actions, 'considered underrated'.
PRINT-READY, FROM THIS CHANNEL
The Document Set, Vol. 01 — Cajamarca 1532 and Buenos Aires 1595-1680 — the documents at reading size, with author, date, archive and licence
https://therepository.gumroad.com/l/document-set
SOURCES — every image in this video is a public-domain document.
Each plate below is listed with its author, date, holding archive and licence.
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Jacques Marie Hacq — 1826 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- C. Turner — 1829 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Museo Historico del Norte, Salta — 1899 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Attributed to Jean Baptiste Madou — c. 1828 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- José Gil de Castro — 1825 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- View of Lima from the Plaza de Toros — c. 1800 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
- Bartolome Mitre — 1890 | Internet Archive (scan) | Public domain
... and 15 more plates, each credited on screen in the video and listed in this project's manifest.