The Port That Was Illegal for a Hundred Years
In fifteen ninety-five the Spanish Crown closed the port of Buenos Aires to trade, and kept it closed for most of the next hundred years. The port never stopped working for a single one of them. The strange part is not the smuggling. The strange part is who was keeping the books.
Chapters
- 0:00 Seven million pesos nobody declared
- 0:28 The port that was never open
- 0:50 Two ways out of Potosi
- 1:19 The decree of fifteen ninety-five
- 1:44 Why close a port
- 2:05 A village with no coin
- 2:34 How to smuggle with paperwork
- 3:07 El contrabando ejemplar
- 3:28 What the cargo was
- 3:59 Hides, tallow, and unstamped silver
- 4:27 The officials
- 4:54 The governor buys his own cargo back
- 5:24 The judge who bought five
- 5:51 The fraud that was one letter
- 6:25 A confession taken under torture
- 6:59 Can it be counted
- 7:23 Nine hundred and eighty-seven a year
- 7:46 Gongora changes sides
- 8:10 Lima builds a dry customs house
- 8:36 It did not work
- 8:57 The great denouncer
- 9:23 A third of every auction
- 9:42 The arithmetic of a poor man
- 10:22 What the treasury sent to Potosi
- 10:44 Suppression was the revenue
- 11:12 The money that stayed
- 11:46 Two hundred ships
- 12:15 Portugal stops pretending
- 12:43 How much left, and how we know
- 13:21 The question the archivist leaves
Transcript
Seven million pesos nobody declared 0:00
Late October, sixteen fifty-four, off the coast of what is now Ecuador. The flagship of the Pacific fleet runs aground and goes down. The official register listed three million pesos of silver. Estimates of what she was actually carrying, once you count what was never declared, run to ten million. Seven million pesos that no document admits existed. And that was the legal route.
The port that was never open 0:28
So if two thirds of a cargo could disappear on the route that had a register, an escort and the king's own flag, what was happening on the route that had none? This is the story of a port that was illegal for a hundred years and never stopped working for a single one of them. And the strange part is not the smuggling. The strange part is who was keeping the books.
Two ways out of Potosi 0:50
There were two ways out of Potosi. The legal one went west and then north: down to the coast, up to Callao, across Panama by mule, out through Portobelo, Cartagena, Havana, and finally Seville. Months, a fleet, and a customs house at every knot. The other way went straight south. Two months by pack mule and cart, and you were standing in Buenos Aires, where the Atlantic starts.
The decree of fifteen ninety-five 1:19
One of those routes was legal. By royal order of fifteen ninety-five, the port of Buenos Aires was closed to trade. Not restricted. Closed. And the Crown held that position, with occasional licences and long gaps, for essentially the entire seventeenth century. That was not neglect. It was the design.
Why close a port 1:44
Because the Spanish system ran through the Caribbean and down the Pacific, and Lima sat in the middle of it collecting. An Atlantic port in the south did not threaten the Crown. It threatened Lima. The law that closed Buenos Aires was not protecting the empire from fraud. It was protecting one route from another one.
A village with no coin 2:05
Meanwhile the town existed. A few hundred people, no mines, almost no coin in circulation, living off shipments from Lima that doubled in price on the way down. In fifteen ninety-six the governor himself writes to the king asking for a licence to import a thousand captives from Guinea at thirty ducats each. Not for the colony. For himself. He offers to have it taken out of his salary.
How to smuggle with paperwork 2:34
So here is how you smuggle through a closed port, using paperwork. The ship declares distress. Damage, weather, no water left. It unloads in the creek south of town. The master comes ashore and negotiates. Then somebody denounces the cargo. The cargo is seized. The seized cargo goes to public auction. And out of that auction comes a permit, correctly stamped, to move the goods inland all the way to Peru.
El contrabando ejemplar 3:07
The paperwork was not the cover for the smuggling. The paperwork was the smuggling. And they had a name for it, which is a joke they made about themselves. They called it el contrabando ejemplar. The exemplary contraband. Exemplary because it observed every single formality.
What the cargo was 3:28
And I have to tell you what the cargo was. It was people. The archive counts them as piezas. Pieces. That is the word in the document, and it is not ours, but every number in the rest of this episode was written down by men who used it. The arithmetic that follows was done on a unit that was human beings. The historian Assadourian measured the margin: one hundred per cent on capital invested in Angola, two hundred if sold in Potosi.
Hides, tallow, and unstamped silver 3:59
And going the other way? Flour from Cordoba. Tallow and hides off the plain. That does not balance against Angola, and it never did. The difference left as silver, in bars and in rough cast lumps, sin quintar, without ever passing through the king's fifth. That is the thing that was actually leaving. Not hides. Untaxed Potosi.
The officials 4:27
None of this works without officials. Harbour bailiff, accountant, treasurer, judge of seizures, governor. In fifteen ninety-four the Crown appoints Alonso de Vera y Aragon as royal accountant at Buenos Aires, specifically to control the arrival of ships. Over his term the record shows him acquiring around fifty captives, out of cargoes that had been seized from the governor of Rio de Janeiro.
The governor buys his own cargo back 4:54
But the clearest case is a governor. Fernando de Zarate sent a ship of his own to Angola. On its return it was seized, and the cargo was put up at public auction, exactly as the law required. Except that the neighbours were afraid of what would happen to them if they bid. Nobody made an offer. And Zarate bought his own cargo back at a derisory price. The auction was not the end of the smuggling. It was the counter.
The judge who bought five 5:24
Fifteen ninety-nine. The notary Mateo Sanchez files a report to the treasury about four ships that had arrived three years earlier. Fifty-seven people brought in and sold within three months. The judge of seizures, Sancho de Figueroa, is formally accused of failing in his duties. The report also records that he bought five of them, off the first ship, for himself.
The fraud that was one letter 5:51
And then there is the cheapest fraud in the entire archive. To move captives inland you needed a dispatch. The traders would request one for dos o tres. Two or three. Then they added a single letter, and dos o tres became doce o trece. Twelve or thirteen. Everything above the first three moved without duties. One letter. Hernandarias reported it, and it is why he made registration before a notary compulsory in sixteen sixteen.
A confession taken under torture 6:25
The most detailed account we have of how the whole machine worked comes from the testimony of a harbour officer named Juan Gomez, in sixteen sixteen. He said that publicly, every magistrate high and low, and every pilot and master who came in, had robbed His Majesty. And you have to be told how that document was produced. It was given under torture, in Hernandarias's presence. The most vivid page in the file is the least trustworthy one, and the reason it is untrustworthy is itself an accusation.
Can it be counted 6:59
Can any of this be counted? Partly. The National Archive in Buenos Aires still holds the ship registers, the old notarial books, and the ledger of captives entered. From those you can build the average number of arrivals per year, governor by governor, from fifteen eighty-seven to sixteen forty. And then one governor breaks the chart.
Nine hundred and eighty-seven a year 7:23
Diego de Gongora, sixteen nineteen to sixteen twenty-three. Nine hundred and eighty-seven a year. Roughly six times what the port had averaged twenty years earlier. During that same administration, writing to the king about the provinces of the River Plate, Gongora described the contraband coming through his port as being of little substance.
Gongora changes sides 7:46
A year later he changes sides and starts denouncing it, which happens to be exactly when he falls out with the group running it. He calls them the moth and the sponge of the estates of this republic. And about one merchant in particular, the Portuguese Diego de Vega, he writes the sentence that sums up the century. While this man is in this land, no governor is powerful.
Lima builds a dry customs house 8:10
Lima did react. In sixteen twenty-two a customs house was set up inland at Cordoba. They called it the dry customs, because it stood on no sea and no river, and it taxed goods coming up from Buenos Aires at fifty per cent. But read who wanted it. It was not the Crown moving against crime. It was the merchants of Lima moving against a competitor.
It did not work 8:36
Five years later, the treasury minutes of October sixteen twenty-seven record the result: goods and captives were slipping past the Cordoba customs and taking the road to Chile instead. The customs house did not close the road. It opened another one. By sixteen fifty-one they had given up and moved it to Salta.
The great denouncer 8:57
Which brings us to the man history remembers as the great enemy of all this. Hernandarias, twice governor of the River Plate and later royal investigating judge. His letters are the single richest source on the illegal trade that survives. Almost everything in this episode about prices, ships, masters and inland routes, we know because Hernandarias wrote it down to complain about it.
A third of every auction 9:23
And the ordinances of the Marquis of Montesclaros, issued in sixteen thirteen, laid down that from every auction of people condemned as forfeit, one third was to be set aside for the judge of seizures. Denouncing paid. Not as corruption. As regulation.
The arithmetic of a poor man 9:42
Hernandarias wrote to court that he had spent his own fortune defending the royal treasury, that he could not afford dowries for his daughters, that his family was destitute. At his end of term audit they confiscated twenty thousand pesos of his goods. The treasury's own defender valued his personal fortune at one hundred and twenty thousand. His daughters' dowries, granted shortly before, came to thirty thousand. His salary as governor was four thousand a year. And the instrument he himself introduced, the manifests, let residents legalise captives held without any licence at all, at seventy pesos a head.
What the treasury sent to Potosi 10:22
So here is what survives, and it is the only real accounting of this trade that exists. The treasury minutes record what the Buenos Aires treasury remitted up to Potosi, year by year, under the heading of entries of captives. Between sixteen fourteen and sixteen twenty-six: four hundred and twenty-three thousand pesos of eight.
Suppression was the revenue 10:44
Add the third from the auctions, plus fifty-seven pesos and six reales of licence and six of local duty on every head, and the treasury of a frontier town with no mines, no encomienda, and a legally closed port, was very much fuller than anything in that town could explain. Seizure and auction were practically the only way to get money into that box in any quantity. Suppressing the trade was how you taxed it.
The money that stayed 11:12
And the money sat there. A royal order of sixteen ten was still chasing thirty thousand pesos out of the seventy thousand collected in sixteen oh four, and ordered an investigation into the merchants who were using the funds in their own dealings for more than five years before handing them over. In sixteen fifteen the royal treasurer, Simon de Valdez, is accused of lending the treasury's money at fifteen per cent, and of having built houses to lodge traders and captives after the arrivals. His arrest is finally ordered in sixteen nineteen.
Two hundred ships 11:46
In sixteen forty the crowns of Spain and Portugal separate, and the Portuguese circuit is cut. The Dutch had taken Angola in sixteen forty-one, and after the peace of Munster in sixteen forty-eight they arrive on the river. Between sixteen forty-eight and seventeen oh two: around two hundred unauthorised ships into the River Plate, against thirty-four licensed ones. The contraband was not the exception at that port. It was the port.
Portugal stops pretending 12:15
And in January of sixteen eighty, Portugal stopped pretending. Manuel Lobo founded Colonia do Sacramento on the opposite bank, about forty kilometres across the water from Buenos Aires. Not a fort, not a trading post. An entire city, planted there to be a warehouse. The governor of Buenos Aires took it that August. A treaty gave it back the following May.
How much left, and how we know 12:43
So how much silver left through this door? Nobody knows, and nobody will, because the entire arrangement was designed to leave no record. But one set of accounts did survive, and it is the accounting of the policing. Every seizure had an auction. Every auction had a third. Every head had a duty. Every remittance had a line. The contraband is legible only through the paperwork of the people paid to stop it, and that is the file nobody ever thought to burn, because it was not evidence of a crime. It was a statement of revenue.
The question the archivist leaves 13:21
The archivist who assembled these papers ends with a question, and it is better than any accusation. Were they corrupt in the ethical sense of the word, or did they act knowing their private profit was justified precisely because the Crown was taking its cut too? Next time on Codice: what happened to Colonia do Sacramento in seventeen fifty, when the Treaty of Madrid traded it away for the land of the seven mission towns east of the Uruguay river. About twenty-six thousand Guarani lived there. Nobody asked them, and they refused to be traded.
Description and sources
There were two ways out of Potosi. The legal one ran west to the Pacific, north to Panama, across the isthmus by mule and home by convoy -- months of travel and an armed fleet. The other ran east, down the rivers to a village on an estuary, and from there to Brazil, to Angola, to Amsterdam. It was two months shorter and it was forbidden.
This episode is about the second one, and about a problem that sounds impossible: how do you measure a trade that was designed, on purpose, to leave no record?
You cannot measure it directly. What survives is the paperwork of the policing. Every seizure had an auction, every auction had a third set aside for the Crown, every head landed carried a licence duty and a customs duty, and every remittance to Potosi was entered in the Acuerdos de la Real Hacienda. The contraband is legible only through the archive of the men who were supposed to stop it -- and that is where the argument turns.
Three things the documents say that the story usually leaves out.
First, the seizure was the sale. Governor Fernando de Zarate sent a ship to Angola; on its return it was seized and the cargo auctioned publicly -- and the neighbours, afraid of reprisal, would not bid, so Zarate bought his own cargo back for almost nothing. The auction of contraband was not the end of the business. It was its distribution channel. The officials had a name for the system, and the name was their own joke: el contrabando ejemplar. The exemplary smuggling.
Second, informing paid by regulation. The Ordenanzas of the Marquis of Montesclaros, of sixteen thirteen, ordered a third of every auction set aside for the Judge of Seizures. Hernandarias entered history as the greatest denouncer of contraband in Buenos Aires, and wrote to the Court that he was destitute and could not dower his daughters. At his residencia they confiscated twenty thousand pesos of his goods; the Crown's own Defender valued his personal fortune at a hundred and twenty thousand; his daughters' dowries had come to thirty thousand. His salary as governor was four thousand a year.
Third, the Crown was paid. Seizures and auctions, with the royal third, plus fifty-seven pesos six of licence and six of customs per head, were very nearly the only way to bring money in quantity into the treasury of Buenos Aires -- a frontier town with no mines, no coin in circulation, and a port that was legally shut. Suppressing the trade was how the Crown collected on it. The seizure was not the punishment of the commerce. It was its tax.
And the cargo was people. The archive counts them as piezas, pieces. That is the word of the document, not ours, and this episode says so out loud rather than letting the accounting stand in for what was being accounted.
The archivist who assembled these papers, Liliana Crespi of Argentina's Archivo General de la Nacion, ends her study with a question better than any accusation: were they corrupt in the ethical sense of the word, or were they acting in the knowledge that their private profit was justified insofar as the Crown was taking its cut too?
PRINT-READY, FROM THIS CHANNEL
The Document Set, Vol. 01 — Cajamarca 1532 and Buenos Aires 1595-1680 — the documents at reading size, with author, date, archive and licence
https://therepository.gumroad.com/l/document-set
SOURCES — every image in this video is a public-domain document.
Each plate below is listed with its author, date, holding archive and licence.
- Adam Willaerts — 1614 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Abel Tasman — after 1642 | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
- Jan Janssonius — [1641-1680] | Wikimedia Commons | Public domain
... and 32 more plates, each credited on screen in the video and listed in this project's manifest.